Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Female circumcision became an issue of international (in particular: Western) concern in the 1970s. 1 It has been condemned by the World Health Organisation (WHO), by virtually all human rights bodies, by governments and by NGOs alike. Male circumcision, on the other hand, has for many years remained unnoticed, escaping both normative evaluation and condemnation. It has generally been regarded, and even been promoted, as benefi cial for men's health. In the last ten years or so, however, male circumcision has received signifi cantly more attention, both positive and negative. An important proponent of male circumcision is the WHO, which currently strongly advocates male circumcision because it is thought to help prevent the spread of HIV/ AIDS. 2 Opposed to male circumcision are men's rights groups, mainly US-based, that try to reduce or even eliminate routine circumcision of newborn boys, invoking arguments of bodily integrity and personal autonomy. 3 Oft en, these attempts focus on circumcision unrelated to religious practices, thus avoiding discussions related to freedom of religion. 4 However, this seems to be changing, especially in Europe, with the decision of the District Court of Cologne of 7 May 2012 being a case in point. Some also argue that the WHO should drop its male circumcision campaign because it allegedly raises false feelings of security, stating that men in Africa in particular are lining up to be circumcised in order to be protected against HIV/AIDS forever aft er, thus eff ectively undermining the whole campaign and endangering the health of their sexual partners. See Th e Cologne court found a doctor guilty of causing bodily harm, for performing circumcision on a four year old Muslim boy. 5 Th e diff erent conceptions of female and male circumcision underscore common, widespread understandings of these practices as very diff erent, though not to say incomparable; 6 the one extremely harmful, the other benign; the one defi ned as mutilation and the other as ritual, routine or even preventive medicine. 7 However, some authors -for one reason or another -suggest that the diff erences between the two are less signifi cant than generally assumed. Th ey argue that these practices should not be considered separately. 8 DeLaet for example, suggests that the most prevalent forms of both male and female circumcision are very similar in form, referring to the kind of operation performed, the level of invasiveness, and their consequences for health, sexuality and reproduction. 9 Even the most invasive forms seem to be comparable in form and consequence, albeit possibly not in prevalence. Moreover, symmetries in moral and social rationales, like sexual control and enforcement of gender identity, are pointed out. Although this focus on the comparability of male and female circumcision, both in forms and justifi cations, while not mainstream in international (human rights) policies, seems to be on the rise in academic literature. 
Intersentia
Th is issue of comparability of the practices of male and female circumcision is highly relevant from a human rights perspective. To the extent that there is some truth in the alleged similarities, we raise the question whether it is legitimate to frame all forms of female circumcision as intolerable violations of human rights while all forms of male circumcision are -in principle -considered to be unproblematic from a human rights perspective. 10 Is that not withholding from men the protection of human rights they are entitled to or, the reverse, unnecessarily curtailing women in their right to self-determination? If it is true that some forms of male and female circumcision overlap, then such diverging conceptions are problematic in (at least) two respects. First, it undermines the claim of universality of human rights, which demands that similar standards should be applied to similar practices. Second, it seems to contradict the sex/gender equality principle, demanding the equal treatment of men and women, unless there is an objective and reasonable justifi cation not to.
In this paper we will explore how male and female circumcision are framed and to what extent the diff erent perceptions of and approaches to these practices can be considered justifi ed in light of the principles of universality of human rights and gender equality. Of course, it is clear that ideas regarding the roles of women and men underlie most of these practices, 11 and, thus, it is also clear that such genderbased motives behind circumcision practices, affi rming the inferiority or superiority of one of either of the sexes, may to some extent justify a diff erent approach to these practices. However, surprisingly, such perceived motives are oft en simply stated as a matter of fact, not supported by any evidence. Th is led us to expect to fi nd gender and cultural bias not only in the eye of the practitioner but also in the eye of the beholder. Th at is, we expect that the unsubstantiated suspicion that circumcision is motivated by gender discrimination may cause equally or even more gender-biased responses to these practices, resulting in gender bias in the protection of peoples' human rights. It is primarily this latter kind of bias that we try to identify here.
By uncovering such bias and suggesting more neutral standards and approaches, we hope to strengthen the universal character of human rights. Biased interpretations and applications of human rights are detrimental to the authority and thus to the eff ectiveness of human rights and therefore should be avoided. Our intention is not to formulate a position on the (un)acceptability of circumcision (male and female) as such, neither is it to present policy or legal reform proposals to combat successfully those circumcision practices that are problematic from a human rights perspective. We focus on the comparability of female and male circumcision and on the consistency of outsiders' perceptions of circumcision and we suggest some standards that may contribute to a more universal and gender-equal application of human rights to practices of circumcision of both men and boys and women and girls.
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Male circumcision may become problematic according to actual human rights standards, when it is carried out in a clearly health threatening way or against the will of the more mature minor or one of the parents of a young child.
To uncover the biases, we focus on the frames used in the debates. 12 Frames have been described as 'subconscious fi ling boxes' that help people to organise and sift information quickly. Th ey help us to come to a value judgment. Th ey are 'oversimplifi ed versions of reality, and therefore do not necessarily refl ect reality'. 13 Frames are not per se the consequence of active framing by, for example, the media or politicians. Frames can also be the product of long-time exposure to specifi c ideas or conceptions. Th us, the frames used to assess the (un)acceptability of male and female circumcision may be both the product of living in a specifi c culture or of active attempts to make us see these practices in a specifi c, diff erent light. By comparing the diff erences in the framing of comparable forms of male and female circumcision, the underlying 'versions of reality' of people using or even actively promoting these frames will surface, which in turn will help identify the biases.
So far, we have used the word 'circumcision' as an umbrella term for all interventions regarding genitals. Th e choice of words is very important, because diff erent words trigger diff erent frames for understanding a particular issue. Kennedy, Fisher and Bailey give an example taken from the fi eld of immigration. Th e concept of an 'illegal alien' invokes a frame focusing on enforcement and violations of law. 'Undocumented worker' on the other hand suggests an administrative context; solutions have to be found in paperwork. Th us, the mere choice of words already sift s out thinkable and unthinkable solutions, and suggests a positive or negative judgment. 14 Th is phenomenon is particularly true when talking about 'circumcision'. Just about any paper, article or policy document on this topic explains and justifi es its word choices. 15 However, this word choice primarily concerns female circumcision. Th e terms mostly used are female genital mutilation, female genital cutting and female circumcision. 16 Th e latter was the regular term at the start of the debate. Th ese days it is rejected -interestingly, because of the suggested comparability with male 12 Th ere is an extensive body of literature on framing theory. See Intersentia circumcision. Th e term female circumcision is rejected because any comparison to male circumcision is rejected: the fi rst is regarded as an unacceptable violation of women's human rights, whereas the second remains unproblematic. Circumcision has been replaced by the far more normative phrase 'genital mutilation'. However, at the same time, it is precisely the negative perception of the practice expressed in the word 'mutilation' which sometimes results in the deliberate avoidance of the phrase. Th is is particularly true in policies and programs targeted at the practicing communities, because it is anticipated that parents and others practicing 'mutilation' will not agree that the practice amounts to mutilation, and thus reject the word 'mutilation' to describe the practice. Accordingly, for strategic reasons, those regarding circumcision as mutilation still do not always refer to it as such, and instead refer to it as cutting, which is considered the more neutral term. 17 Male circumcision is normally just referred to as 'circumcision'. However, increasingly, groups advocating the abandonment of routine circumcision on newborn baby boys in the US do refer to it as male cutting, or even male genital mutilation. 18 We have thought hard about other, new words, such as 'tinkering' to try and avoid stepping into one or another ready-made frame immediately. However, such terminology entails its own problems. Th erefore, we decided to stick to 'circumcision' because it is the oldest word to describe these practices, it seems the least normative and it is applicable to both female and male circumcision.
Th e following section starts with a description of prevalence, forms, geographical spread and motivations of male and female circumcision, culminating in a typology of circumcisions. Th is typology gives a fi rst indication of the frames for male and female circumcision used in the discussions. An inventory of these frames will be done in section 3. We continue with an analysis of the frames, with a special focus on diff erences: are these caused by biased perceptions or are these justifi ed by facts or reasons (section 4)? We conclude that the very diff erent approaches to and perceptions of female and male circumcision are not completely justifi ed by diff erences between these practices and/or by the diff erences in position of the men and women, boys and girls subjected to these practices. Th at is why we identify some standards, in the conclusion (paragraph 5), that could contribute to a human rights frame that is more acceptable in light of the universality of human rights and the gender equality principle. 
Intersentia
Th e predominant form of male circumcision entails the total or partial removal of the prepuce, the outer skin surrounding the glans (head) of the penis. Th is form of male circumcision is most comparable to the most common form of female circumcision called 'sunna' which involves the removal of the prepuce of the clitoris. 25 In both of these forms of male and female circumcision 'a part of the genitalia with a dense concentration of neuroreceptors specialised for sexual sensation and expression' is removed. 26 Th ere are also more invasive forms of both male and female circumcision. An example of very invasive male circumcision is 'peeling the skin of the entire penis, sometimes including the skin of the scrotum and pubis' and male circumcision involving 'a subincision of the urinary tube from the scrotum to the glans'. 27 Th e most extreme form of female circumcision is infi bulation, which entails the 'narrowing of the vaginal orifi ce with creation of a covering seal by cutting and appositioning the labia minora and/or the labia majora, with or without excision of the clitoris'. 28 A form of female circumcision that has no male equivalent is the 'partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora, with or without excision of the labia majora (excision)'. Th is type of circumcision is said to eliminate sexual pleasure, although there are women who still report sexual satisfaction. 29 In contrast to these invasive forms of circumcision, there are also less invasive forms of female circumcision than the most common male variants, like 'ritualistic nicking' or 'cutting of the clitoris'. Th ese are sometimes called 'sunna light' or symbolic circumcision. DeLaet, loc.cit., note 9, at p. 413.
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Ibidem, at pp. 411-412: the former is assumed to be practiced still by some tribes in South Arabia; the latter is practiced by Australian aborigines. Th is form belongs to the fourth classifi cation type of the WHO: 'All other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for non-medical purposes, for example: pricking, piercing, incising, scraping Circumcision can have serious health complications, irrespective of the sex of the person subjected to it. However, the more invasive the form of circumcision is, the higher the risks of serious complications. Complications following male circumcision seem dependent primarily on the level of hygiene and professionalism of the practitioner. For female circumcision, however, research shows more mixed results. Female circumcisions that have been carried out by medical professionals still entail health risks and other consequences, presumably linked to the level of invasiveness. It has to be noted though that the fi gures found for female circumcision generally are not segregated to the level of invasiveness. 31 Most men are circumcised in their childhood. In the US and in some African tribes, boys are circumcised immediately aft er being born. In Judaism, boys are circumcised on the eighth day aft er birth. Boys belonging to the amaXhosa in South Africa and some other indigenous minorities are circumcised in late puberty or even as young adults. 32 Th e age of circumcision for women also varies, from infants a few days old to adult women, the latter for instance at the occasion of their marriage. 33 According to UNICEF, the most common age range to circumcise girls is between 4 and 14. 34 Th e purposes of circumcision vary from group to group. Female circumcision is oft en part of the rites of passage, marking the coming of age of children, but it also serves to control female sexuality, by reducing sexual desire, and to help girls to remain virgin or chaste. 35 In Britain, Canada and the US, it was practiced in the 18-19 th century to prevent masturbation and cure hysteria and some psychiatric conditions. 36 Male circumcision is also related to sexuality, but in varying and even Dustin, loc.cit., note 29, at p. 9. Dustin also argues that the depicted health consequences are not inevitable but 'usually a worst-case scenario'. Johnsdotter and Essén contend that the health consequences are oft en exaggerated and miss scientifi c evidence. Johnsdotter, S. Intersentia contradictory ways. On the one hand, it is promoted for chastity reasons and to reduce sexual pleasure, but, on the other hand, (male) circumcision is sometimes said to prolong sexual interaction. 37 Circumcision also serves as an identity marker of a social or religious group. Th is can entail a combination of a tribal, adult and gender identity (as is oft en the case with male and female circumcision in Africa), as well as a combination of religious and gender identity, as is the case with male circumcision in Judaism and Islam. Th ese identity markers serve to confi rm the in-group identity. 38 Th e rationales for male circumcision (that may overlap) generally fall into three categories: Th e fi rst category is of a cultural ritualistic nature. It confi rms gender roles in adulthood and includes control of sexuality. Th e second category points at perceived health benefi ts, such as the prevention of HIV/ AIDS infections. Adapting to what is 'normal' may come under this heading as well. Th e third category refers to religious reasons, which are more or less ritualistic. Th ere is no question for Muslims and Jews as to the religious background of the practice. However, there is some debate on whether the obligation to circumcise a child constitutes a core obligation, or is more of a secondary obligation. 39 Female circumcision is equally based on these rationales. Th e fi rst rationale seems to be dominant, although the other motives seem to be present and intertwined as well. Female circumcision is usually referred to as a 'social convention' that can only be discontinued by persuading the entire community to abandon the practice (rationale 1 and 2). Th e lack of a religious source (rationale 3) for the practice is oft en emphasised in campaigns seeking to eradicate female circumcision. And although female circumcision may be part of a ritual (rationale 1), male circumcision, and in particular its very invasive forms, may also be a test of masculinity. In these cases, there is a rejection of medical interventions or assistance -which seems to be absent in female circumcision (maybe not really surprising). Th is might explain the ready adoption by practicing communities of the -now internationally rejected -medical frame for women, which refers to the second rationale and was originally introduced to prevent the more severe health complications. 
TYPES OF CIRCUMCISION
On the basis of these types of rationales combined with the forms of circumcision, a typology of three of the most common types can be made. 40 As far as comparability is concerned, obviously the fi rst type entails both female and male circumcision.
1. Cultural, ritualistic, with emphasis on gender roles in adulthood, including control of sexuality: carried out by traditional circumcisers, without anaesthesia as a rite of passage from infant to adult men or women with a high risk for health and even life; practiced by some ethnic groups in Africa. We will call this the African type. 2. Cultural, non-ritualistic, with emphasis on health/hygiene and social and sexual normality: carried out (routinely) by medical staff , most commonly on newborn boys, without therapeutic indication, and with a highly debated risk of mental and physical harm. 41 Th e medical motive is also present in Africa, fi rstly to curb the serious physical consequences of type 1 on men and women and secondly to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS, but is not routinely carried out on newborn males. We will take the routinely carried out neonatal circumcision (RNC) as paradigmatic for this type and as this is mostly performed in the US, we will call this the American type. 42 3. Religious, more or less ritualistic, predominantly in Judaism and Islam, but also among Christians, particularly in Africa. In Judaism, male circumcision is considered to be a commandment of God to the father to have it carried out at a very young age on his son (on the eighth day aft er birth). Muslim boys are sometimes circumcised when a bit older and the Islamic obligation to circumcise is less strict than within Judaism. In general, female circumcision is not considered to be a compulsory religious practice. Some consider it at the most recommendable, but the religious nature of this recommendation is again contested; cultural infl uences seem to be at play. 43 In both Judaism and Islam male circumcision is carried out 40 Dekkers, Hoff er and Wils, loc.cit., note 5, at p. 180, have a diff erent typology. Th ey distinguish between '(1) medical-therapeutic, (2) preventive-hygienic, (3) religious and (4) cultural reasons'. We use a broader conception of culture that includes culture-specifi c perceptions of health. Th is typology is interesting as it not only puts into perspective the comparability of male and female circumcision, but also gives a fi rst indication of how both male and female circumcision are framed.
FRAMES 3.1. INTRODUCTION
Th ree diff erent frames dominate the discussion on circumcision: a medical/health frame, a cultural and/or religious frame and a human rights frame. With regard to male circumcision, the medical/health frame serves primarily to oppose or defend circumcision for bodily reasons. Cultural and religious frames refer to non-bodily reasons to attack or defend circumcision. Th e human rights frame is a kind of accessory frame: it is used to strengthen (one or both of) the other frames in the discussion whether (a certain form of) male circumcision is legitimate or not and can be found in both areas. With regard to female circumcision, the same frames are used, but with diff erent accents and gaps. Th e medical/health frame is never used to support female circumcision, except maybe by those of the in-group who practise female circumcision. As these groups are largely absent in the discussion, the medical/health frame is rather used to oppose female circumcision. In the past it was also used to promote safer conditions, but this was dropped when the frame turned out to be 'too successful', resulting in continued practice instead of a gradual decline. Furthermore, the religious frame for female circumcision is only marginal, while a cultural frame seems to represent an anti-position, again taking into account that proponents of the practice are almost absent from the discussion. Most importantly, contrary to male circumcision, a human rights frame is not an accessory frame, but the most dominant frame for (condemning) female circumcision. Let us consider each of these frames.
3.2. THE BODY: THE MEDICAL/HEALTH FRAME Dominant in the arguments concerning the body is the medical/health frame, which touches on notions of (preventive) health benefi ts, including issues of hygiene, on the one hand, and risks or harm, including psychological harm, on the other hand. Th e positive or negative infl uence on the functioning of sexual parts of the body is also covered by this medical/health frame.
Proponents of male circumcision use the medical/health frame as follows: because male circumcision has health benefi ts (and hygiene and sexual benefi ts), male circumcision is legitimate. Opponents use the frame by stressing the health risks and even the harm that can be infl icted. In this area, medical professionals dominate the discussion with an appeal to scientifi c medical knowledge. 44 Health and avoidance of harm is the shared frame. Th e discussion is concentrated on the question whether health benefi ts or suff ers from male circumcision. Th is discussion takes place especially in the US with regard to the American type of routine neonatal circumcision on boys. 45 A similar debate is conducted on the scientifi c proof of claimed health consequences. Th e discussion with regard to the promotion of male circumcision in Sub-Saharan Africa in response to HIV/AIDS includes contextual factors, such as the (low/high) costs of male circumcision compared to anti-AIDS medicines or condoms and sexual behavioural practices that may undermine the perceived protection against HIV/ AIDS. 46 In the European context, in contrast, the health frame is used to oppose the most prevalent practice of male circumcision, that is the Abrahamic type. 47 Th e health frame is also an important frame in the African type of male circumcision. If we take the confl ict between the amaXhosa and the government of South Africa as paradigmatic it is the State that uses the health frame to delegitimise the male circumcision as carried out by ritual circumcisers, as far as they do not follow the hygienic procedures as required by the State in order to diminish the high rates of health complications and morbidity among circumcised teenage boys. Traditional leaders and ritual circumcisers oft en do not share this frame: health risks and harm are celebrated as symbolic death in the rite of passage and actual death is accepted. 48 In the religious, Abrahamic, type of male circumcision the health frame is less dominant. Religious reasons are in the forefront and when the health frame is used, it is oft en presented in (or in combination with) a religious frame, as we will see below.
Although defi nitely perceived as a human rights violation, female circumcision was in the initial stages framed by the Western dominated international community as a medical issue, presumably to avoid accusations of neo-colonialist practices. Th ose who 44 Medical professionals may be either proponents or opponents of male circumcision, using scientifi cally, but apparently also culture specifi c medical/health arguments. Compare Dekkers, loc.cit., note 4, p. 131, and Johnson, loc.cit., note 8, p. 183. Still, it is repeatedly reported in literature that there are probably minimal health advantages of (routine) male circumcision, but that these are not suffi cient to counterbalance the disadvantages or risks of health complications. 45 Szasz however rejects this frame, arguing that it hides the ritual origin and the moral (and legal) character of the practice. Szasz, loc.cit., note 4. 46 See e.g. Fox and Th omson, loc.cit., note 3, at pp. 263-266. 47 See e.g. Askola, loc.cit., note 5, at p. 110. Intersentia used this medical frame, urged people to have the circumcision of girls and women done by health care professionals to reduce health complications. However, as pointed out above, the medical framing was so successful, that now international collective action is taken so as to actively stop health-care providers from performing female circumcisions. 49 Oft en the health frame is also used to stress the radical diff erence with male circumcision: female circumcision has no health benefi ts at all. To the contrary, it is said to cause extremely serious (long lasting) health consequences, while the health benefi ts of male circumcision are at least equivocal. 50 It is interesting to note that there has been a deliberate separation of male circumcision from female circumcision for bodily reasons as 'the fi ght against female genital mutilation would be more diffi cult if male circumcision were also to be challenged'. 51 So, while there is a lively discussion on the medical/health benefi ts of male circumcision, the dominant claim of the devastating bodily eff ects of female circumcision is very rarely contested. Nonetheless, it has also been pointed out that at least in the past, the consequences of female circumcision have been exaggerated somewhat and that many of the consequences attributed to female circumcision seem related to poor medical conditions surrounding pregnancy and giving birth, and thus are suff ered equally by uncircumcised women. 52 However, the WHO's Global strategy report mentions that 'in certain countries some health-care providers consider FGM to be medically indicated for most women, while others see the practice as harmless'. 53 In particular, members of practicing communities opposing female circumcision still prefer the medical frame because it is regarded as more neutral, less normative than other frames such as the human rights frame. Moreover, the frame is much narrower, and 54 See Boyle and Carbone-López, loc.cit., note 25, at p. 451. Th is narrow approach is considered to be both an advantage, in that it depoliticises the practice, and a disadvantage, because it dismisses 3.3. THE BODY: THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAME Th e human rights frame that is used to strengthen the medical/health frame includes the right to life, when the practice results in death, 55 the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 56 the right to health and the related obligation of States to abolish traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children. 57 Most of these human and children's rights presuppose health risks or bodily harm and as such are used by opponents of male circumcision. However the right to enjoy the highest standards of physical health can be used as well by proponents who are convinced of health benefi ts. 58 Th e opponents of female circumcision have an easier job to claim that the practice is harmful for the health of girls as both the CEDAW Committee and the Committee on the Rights of the Child have identifi ed female circumcision explicitly as such a practice. 59 Along the same line, Article 5 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the rights of women in Africa, mentions female circumcision as a harmful practice that should be eradicated. Furthermore, the CEDAW Committee and the Human Rights Committee have denounced female circumcision as violence against women. 60 In addition, the Committee Against Torture has qualifi ed female circumcision as a form of torture with regard to which States must exercise due diligence. 61 Th e dominant human rights frame in the discussion on male circumcision is the right to bodily integrity. Th is right is not as such formulated in a binding human rights instrument for European countries, 62 It is formulated in Art. 3 UDHR and in the American and African regional human rights charters. To date, there has not been a case regarding male circumcision decided by the ECtHR.
Intersentia specifi c human rights, of which the right to privacy is the most obvious. 63 Th e notion of bodily integrity is a complex (ethical) notion. It entails protection against external interference of the body and the right of self-determination over the body. Both elements are of relevance with regard to male circumcision. Th e external protection part is used to criticise unnecessary or violent interventions by circumcisers (especially in relation to the African and American types). Some use the term child abuse in this regard. 64 Th e self-determination approach in the discussion on male circumcision goes beyond the medical/health frame: it states clearly that whatever the medical/health aspects -positive, neutral or negative -it should be the decision of the child himself at an older age or as an adult to have his body altered. Th is clearly refers to the American and Abrahamic, and more specifi cally the Jewish, types of male circumcision, in which children are circumcised at a young age. It also opposes the quite broadly accepted position that parents can decide for their minor son, in case of presumed positive health eff ects as well as in case of the (assumed) absence of a clear indication of positive and negative health eff ects.
One diff erence between the human rights frames on male and female circumcision stands out: the virtually unquestioned acceptance of all forms of female circumcisions as harmful, violent and tortuous, that should be outlawed even for consenting adults. In terms of bodily integrity, female circumcision is apparently considered primarily as an external interference of the body, which seems to imply that the other aspect of bodily integrity, namely the right of self-determination over the own body is not taken into consideration. Protection of girls and women against an outside intrusion is what counts fi rst and foremost.
NON-BODILY REASONS: CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS FRAMES
In the debate on circumcision there are defenders of the practice, irrespective of medical or health reasons. Th ey argue that although male and female circumcision is about the body, it is legitimate for non-bodily, immaterial reasons. Th e arguments in favour of male circumcision can be identifi ed as cultural and religious frames. Th e arguments in favour of female circumcision seem to be restricted to a cultural frame. Th e cultural frame that legitimises both male and female circumcision corresponds to the African type. Male and female circumcision is considered necessary with regard to the gender and age identity. It signifi es the status of the adult gendered person within the cultural group. Th e accessory human rights frame that is used to strengthen the cultural frame, is the right to culture. Arguments against female circumcision are also coached in a cultural frame. Such a cultural practice is denounced as 'bad tradition' 65 or as a harmful 'traditional' practice. 66 Th e accessory human rights frame focuses on the perceived underlying gendered rationale of female circumcision as based on the inferiority of women and/or stereotyped roles for men and women. 67 In the American type, the legitimacy of male circumcision is based on notions of beauty, sexual appeal and normality. Th is cultural frame is put forward by male and female adults, but also by parents who are allowed to decide about the surgery of their boys. An appeal to the human rights frame in the latter case is done by subsuming the decision of parents as the right to family life and qualifying it as in 'the best interests of the child'. 68 Th e argument of the best interests of the child seems to gain ground as a result of dwindling scientifi c conviction that male circumcision has benefi cial health eff ects. It runs as follows: in so far as there are no clear indications of positive or negative health eff ects of male circumcision, parents may decide for their child because they are in the best position to know what is in the best interests of the child. Th e notion of the best interests of the child encompasses cultural non-bodily reasons. 69 Th ose who oppose the American type because of the human rights notion of bodily integrity and especially the self-determination of the child, are critical of the parental choice model. Th ey point out that the irreversibility and health risks of male circumcision imply that the choice for male circumcision should not be made by the parents, but by their child. But as the boy is not yet capable of an autonomous choice at an early age, it is in the best interest of the child to postpone the moment for deciding on circumcision until he is able to make an informed and free decision himself. Th e cultural value of individual autonomy requires this. Th e human rights framework that strengthens this liberal culture of individual rights includes the right to bodily integrity and the best interests of the child. However, this line of reasoning does not seem to extend to female circumcision. For instance, adult women who would ask to be circumcised on the occasion of their marriage should, arguably, not be facilitated but receive 'information and consultation' (although the outcome of the consultation is not debatable apparently). Likewise, requests of women who have just given birth and demand to be reinfi bulated should be refused. 71 Th is contrasts not only with the still rather unsuccessful attempts to get male physical integrity on the human rights agenda, but also with the emphasis of the advocates of the ending of male circumcision on newborn boys, on the fact that practices of male circumcision are unacceptable because these infants cannot consent. Male circumcision on consenting adults as such is not targeted by these groups.
Interestingly, in the American literature the human rights notion of bodily integrity as an argument against male circumcision of children is used almost exclusively as an argument against the American type. Because this notion of bodily integrity can be considered in a secular and individualist way, it can of course be used as well against the Abrahamic type, a development that seems to become more noticeable in Europe. 72 However, so far, the debate on the Abrahamic type has been framed mainly in religious terms among proponents and opponents within Judaism and Islam. One issue for debate is whether male circumcision is a strong religious obligation or a recommendable practice, as it is not mentioned in the Koran. Other issues are whether alteration of the body is allowed, considering the belief that man is created in the image of God, and whether he is allowed to infl ict pain or even create health risks. 73 Also the gendered aspect of male circumcision is debated. 74 In discussions between in-groups and out-groups or about practicing groups, the human rights frames used center primarily on the meaning and scope of the freedom of religion, including the right of parents to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in accordance with their own convictions. Other fundamental rights issues that feature in the debate are the right to family life and the question of whether the 'best interest of the child' is limited to the individual interests of children, or encompasses collective family, cultural and religious interests. In the above frame analysis of the discussion on male circumcision we have discussed proponents and opponents. Of course this is too simple. Th e debate covers a whole range of positions including in-between positions that take into account the form of the circumcision and the dimension of health benefi ts, the seriousness of health risks or other harm. Th us, the practice may be accepted when it is carried out in a medical, professional or safe way. Some have a diff erent interpretation of bodily integrity or include both contextual and individual interests of children when trying to decide on their best interests. 76 However, these in-between positions are virtually absent as regards female circumcision.
NON-BODILY REASONS: THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAME AS THE DOMINANT FRAME FOR FEMALE CIRCUMCISION
Female circumcision was initially framed as a cultural and health issue. Th is changed at the end of the 1970s when female circumcision was tabled by American writer and feminist activist Fran Hosken, who may be regarded as the 'founding mother' of a world-wide crusade against the practice. 77 Since then, the practice was framed as a human rights violation, although the draft ers of the CEDAW Convention more or less deliberately avoided the topic and refrained from including a provision on physical integrity in the Convention. 78 As already mentioned elsewhere, the Convention's monitoring body nonetheless adopted several General Recommendations referring to the reprehensibility of the practice. by the World Health Assembly 80 and by many other both governmental and nongovernmental international bodies. 81 Th e human rights frame that is directly related to the body, such as the right to health, life, freedom from harmful practices, torture or physical violence are mentioned above. Besides these 'bodily human rights', female circumcision is framed in non-bodily human rights terms, especially as a refl ection of 'deep-rooted inequality between the sexes' and 'an extreme form of discrimination against women', and as a (cultural) practice that is based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. 82 As such, the gendered character of female circumcision is the focal point. Th is is confi rmed in the oft en stated 'fact' that female circumcision is a violation of the human rights of girls and women. Th ere seem to be no organisations that advocate the practice, although the condemnation of the least invasive form of female circumcision, 'pricking', has been questioned and is regarded by some, among them doctors and even state offi cials, as an acceptable alternative for practicing communities. 83 Th e complete separation of male and female circumcision is not a coincidence, but the result of conscious eff orts 'to separate, in people's minds, male circumcision, which has a hygienic function, and female circumcision, which is a grave attack on the physical integrity of women'. 84 Th e qualifi cation of circumcision as a form of sexdiscrimination is absent in discussions on male circumcision, although the fact that male circumcision has so far been ignored by the international human rights agenda has been characterised by some as a form of gender bias in itself. 85 Th is, however, is a diff erent notion. Th e idea that male circumcision, in itself, is somehow a form of discrimination of men is never raised.
Th us far, we have identifi ed the frames for both male and female circumcision. Th e most obvious results for male circumcision are that the medical/health, cultural and religious frames are still quite strong, so long as the actual circumcision is carried out in a safe way. Nevertheless, this in-between position with an accessory human rights frame towards male circumcision is increasingly criticised by the human rights notion of bodily integrity of the child/man. In contrast, the dominant frame in the discourse on female circumcision is the human rights frame of women's and girls' rights that denounces any in-between position, extends beyond the medical/health frame and disqualifi es the (African) cultural frame.
4.
ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Aft er this inventory of the contrasting frames for male and female circumcision, we return to the question whether this (partly) diff erent framing is justifi ed from the viewpoint of universality of human rights. Universal validity requires that similar standards should be applied to similar practices. Likewise, the sex/gender equality principle demands the equal treatment of men and women, unless there is an objective and reasonable justifi cation not to do so. Th e dominant position regarding male and female circumcision is that they are in no way comparable. Still, one would expect arguments to be consistent, regardless of comparability and regardless of one's ideas about the practice. Th erefore, fi rst the consistency of the arguments of proponents and opponents will be explored. We have not come across arguments in the literature against male circumcision and in favour of female circumcision, 86 so this position will not be discussed. A more recently evolved position opposes both male and female circumcision because of medical/health risks or harm. Some hold that, even if there are no health risks, the notion of bodily integrity requires outlawing circumcision of children, as long as there are no clear health benefi ts.
Opponents of male circumcision who are confronted with the actual situation in which male circumcision is allowed, while female circumcision is prohibited, use an additional human rights frame: discrimination of boys. So far there is consistency. Interestingly, however, the idea that adult women might choose to be circumcised or (re)infi bulated does not fi gure in the debate. 87 Until recently, everyone has been silent about adult women, who according to the accessory human rights notion of self-determination would be allowed to have female circumcision carried out on their own body, while male circumcision does not meet any opposition as far as adult men 86 However, Limborgh, op.cit., note 83, at pp. 164-177, attacks the form of male circumcision called periah and defends one form of female circumcision, namely sunna light or symbolic pricking. are concerned. 88 Th e only consistent reason to prohibit adult female circumcision and allow male circumcision is the far more serious health risks or bodily harm in case of some of the forms of female circumcision. In that case, the violent intervention aspect of bodily integrity by those who carry out the circumcision could override the selfdetermination aspect of bodily integrity. Not every intervention on the human body is justifi ed just because it is requested by the person concerned.
Th e approach of proponents of male circumcision towards female circumcision is more diverse. Th ere are proponents of both male and female circumcision, but they are not directly involved in the academic discussion. Proponents of circumcision of both men and women can be found within some Islamic cultures and presumably in some African cultures which practice both male and female circumcision. 89 In so far as this position is taken on the basis of a specifi c perception of gender roles, it would be interesting to explore the dominant perception that female circumcision is sex discrimination whereas male circumcision is not. However, far more oft en proponents of male circumcision are critical of female circumcision. How can this be explained? What is apparently not comparable?
EXPLANATIONS FOR ENDORSING MALE BUT REJECTING FEMALE CIRCUMCISION
Th ere are several explanations for this apparent inconsistency. First, it is possible that health benefi ts of female circumcision are absent. Th is undermines a suffi cient bodily justifi cation. Second, the health risks or bodily harms may be too serious to render female circumcision legitimate for non-bodily reasons. A third possible explanation is that the non-bodily reasons in the sphere of religion and culture are not considered important enough to outweigh health risks or bodily harm. Indeed, literature shows that while some health benefi ts are ascribed to male circumcision (especially in some contexts), these are absent with regard to female circumcision. But this cannot be decisive. Th e second argument requires a closer look at the diff erent forms/methods of male and female circumcision. Some types of male and female circumcision are quite similar, while others diff er signifi cantly. Th ere are very invasive forms of male circumcision and very light forms of female 88 KNMG pays attention to this aspect, indicating however that the permission of the patient does not off er suffi cient justifi cation for others (like doctors) to perform the intervention. Th erefore an additional reason is required, such as medical interest. KNMG, op.cit., note 63, at p. 14. See also CEDAW Committee/Committee on the Rights of the Child, Joint CEDAW-CRC General Recommendation/Comment on Harmful Practices: Call for papers, that explicitly mentions harmful practices detrimental to the well-being of boys, available at www2.ohchr.org/english/ bodies/cedaw/JointCEDAW-CRC-GeneralRecommendation.htm (last accessed 1 October 2012).
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Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh, loc.cit., note 39, at pp. 6-7, mentions religious arguments in favour of female and male circumcision within the Islam; it has to be said that the proponents of both male circumcision and female circumcision within the Islam do not have the same arguments for both types.
circumcision and the other way around, as described in section 2. Th us, one cannot consistently uphold the health risks/bodily harm arguments in favour of all forms of male circumcision and against all forms of female circumcision.
Th e third explanation is the most normative, with expected variations between internal and external standpoints. It is here that the external standpoints tend to focus on kinds of cultural harms regardless of the form of female circumcision, while ignoring male circumcision. Female circumcision is consistently looked at from the perspective of women's subordinate position in practicing cultures. Women are required to remain chaste, which is easier when the possibility to experience sexual pleasure is diminished. It may be diffi cult for uncircumcised women to fi nd a suitable husband. However, continuing the practice for that purpose merely strengthens the status quo. Also, male circumcision may be perceived as the stronger religious obligation in comparison with female circumcision. However, some of these disadvantages or harms, such as diminished sexual pleasure and the need to belong to the group, can be attributed to male circumcision as well. Th us, in so far as male and female circumcisions are comparable, this seems an indication that criteria are not consistently applied, when the same criteria lead to diff erent outcomes in similar cases.
INCONSISTENCIES: THREE BIASES AT WORK
Th e second and third explanations seem to lay bare the inconsistency as regards proponents of male circumcision who -at the same time -are opponents of female circumcision. It is this position that we question. However, a remark should be made: the most dominant position seems to be that male circumcision is neglected, while female circumcision is condemned, without a serious comparison being made. Proponents of male circumcision stress the (contested) positive health eff ects of male circumcision and may acknowledge minor health risks or harm, but see an overall benefi t in religious or cultural reasons. At the same time, female circumcision is regarded as genital mutilation; thus, as degrading violence against women that is not a religious obligation but grounded in discriminatory cultural practices. We assume that there are at least three biases at work.
Th e fi rst explanation relates to gender: we suspect that women are quickly perceived as victims of their culture or religion, while men are not. An indication of gender bias is the 'framing' of female circumcision as an expression of women's subordinate and disempowered role, which is completely absent from any discussion on male circumcision. However, even though female circumcision defi nitely seems to be grounded in gendered expectations regarding women's role in life, it is also true that the practice is continued by women mostly, and there are indications that if all women in a community would decide to discontinue the practice, it might not lead to much male resistance. 90 Th us, the perception of women in the practicing communities as (just) victims seems to be gendered. It appears to be not only gender biased but also partly Western biased in that the West is unable to see the agency of these women. Similarities with contemporary practices of cosmetic plastic surgery are overlooked or ignored. Th erefore, although gender norms are criticised by those opposing female circumcision, they are confi rmed at the same time by accepting male circumcision. Th is is arguably reinforced by conceptualising female circumcision as female genital mutilation that is a serious interference of women's rights. Th is view can lead to the neglect of men's human rights, and is only redressed now through the notion of children's rights. 91 Th is gendered perception of circumcision is probably enforced as far as female circumcision is considered to be a harmful practice of an 'other' or 'exotic' or 'traditional' culture, located in some parts of Africa. In other words, a second explanation for the inconsistencies identifi ed, may be that practices in another culture are more easily considered unjust and senseless than practices of one's own or a familiar culture. 92 Th is may occur in the West, but of course it also occurs in other parts of the world, including Africa. 93 Yakin Ertürk, the special rapporteur on violence against women, has noted how the 'harmful traditional practices agenda' has 'contributed to essentialising certain cultures as the source of the problem'. 94 Interestingly, this cultural frame was initially a reason to ignore female circumcision: the sensitive intercultural relations aft er decolonisation rendered female circumcision too touchy a topic for an intercultural discussion. Female circumcision was considered an issue of culture (or religion) that should be considered 'private' and an area of non-intervention. Th is position has changed though into a warlike framing by opponents of all forms of female circumcision, called female genital mutilation (FGM), as women's human rights that can be addressed regardless of the cultural or 90 'private' character. 95 Th e defi nitions used for female circumcision are broad, so as to make sure that all practices fall within its scope. Th e WHO defi nition reads 'Th e term "female genital mutilation" refers to all procedures involving partial or total removal of the external female genitalia, or other injury to the female genital organs for nonmedical reasons'. 96 Presumably, this defi nition is adopted at least partly for strategic reasons and reasons of eff ectiveness, to avoid confusion in the communities involved as to which practices are and which are not acceptable; prohibiting all forms will give the best guarantee that all harmful practices are properly understood as unacceptable. Th e WHO defi nition does encompass 'Western' contemporary practices such as vaginoplasty. Th is is not per se problematic, if indeed one wishes to end all such practices. However, it is not at all clear that these practices are acknowledged at all by anti-female circumcision advocates, and if so, that they are likewise rejected as unacceptable. 97 In the same line of Western and gender bias, is the rejection of the idea of consent if not by all, at least by most anti-female circumcision campaigners. Th is seems to be in clear opposition to the Western approach to cosmetic surgery, which is grounded in the presumption of consenting adults, and by some even more or less celebrated as an example of women's agency, empowerment and an expression of their own free will. 98 Th is bias of culture can also explain how a dangerous or even harmful practice of male circumcision in one's own (or especially the American) culture is downplayed or overlooked. 99 A third explanation is a variation of the second one. It is easier to downplay the value of a rule or practice of 'another' or a 'strange' religion or to consider it even illegitimate than to one's own religion or a familiar religion. Th is can explain why it is easier for Westerners to condemn female circumcision that is carried out (as a ritual) in the name of Islam or of African traditional religions than to criticise male circumcision that is essential as a ritual in Judaism and as an Abrahamic religion familiar to Islam and Christianity. It explains that the dominant discussion in America is about routine neonatal circumcision, leaving aside 'ritual' male circumcision. Th e fear of being accused of anti-Semitism could be an important reason for separating the medical and human rights frame of bodily integrity from the religious and human rights frame of freedom of religion. 100 
CONCLUSION
We have noticed a diff erent normative approach of male and female circumcision, mainly neglecting or respecting the former and condemning the latter. First, we asked whether diff erences in the practices of male and female circumcision could justify this diff erent normative assessment. We found that the most common forms of male and female circumcision are comparable, but that there are also more as well as less invasive forms of female circumcision than the most common male variants, just as there are extremely intrusive forms of male circumcision. It seems, however, that female circumcision overall entails more serious health complications, especially as a result of more invasive forms of female circumcision. Th is implies that the general condemnation of female circumcision and almost total acceptance of male circumcision should be nuanced. Second, we asked whether diff erences in rationales could justify the diff erent normative evaluation. Th e rationales are quite similar, although the importance of these rationales for male and female circumcision diff ers. Male circumcision is based on a variety of rationales including culturally defi ned gender roles, perceived health benefi ts and religious obligation. In contrast, the most important reason for female circumcision originates in culturally defi ned gender roles. Th e religious rationale for female circumcision is considered to be weak and health benefi ts are absent. Outsiders seem biased in their assessment of male and female circumcision. Gender and cultural bias play a role in condemning female circumcision in 'alien' cultures, while overlooking female genital operations in Western culture and respecting male circumcision in culturally familiar religion(s). Th is is refl ected in the way male and female circumcision is framed as a human rights issue.
As far as male circumcision is concerned, the ongoing debate on perceived health risks or health benefi ts is supplemented by an accessory human rights frame that tries to strengthen cultural and religious arguments. Th e attack on the legitimacy of male circumcision is based on the cultural notion of privacy and individual autonomy or bodily integrity of the child/adult, while the defense of the legitimacy of the practice is argued with the (more collective) right to culture, to family life and the freedom of religion, especially the right of parents to provide direction and guidance to the child in the exercise of his right to freedom of religion.
Th e discussion, thus, seems to center on who may legitimately decide what is in the best interest of the boy/man: he himself as a child (depending on age), his parents, he himself as an adult or the State. In the human rights frame of male circumcision, respect for and protection of individual bodily integrity, on the one hand, and respect for private or religious group life, on the other hand, dominates.
As far as female circumcision is concerned, the human rights frame is not about who may legitimately decide about what is in the best interests of the girl/woman: the international community has already decided that it is in the best interests of the girl/ woman to condemn female circumcision as mutilation, harmful tradition and sex discrimination. In the human rights frame of female circumcision, protection against infringements of bodily integrity by cultural groups dominates.
In order to evaluate male and female circumcision in a more universal and gender equal way, and thus in a more truly human rights way, we propose to start with the observation that circumcision is an intervention of the right to bodily integrity of every human being, irrespective of sex or age. As such, our proposal is to leaveat least initially -the frames of female and male circumcision behind and focus on the intervention itself. Th e intervention of the body is easily justifi ed in case of clear health benefi ts and is easily condemned in case of highly serious physical harm or health risks. Th is implies, on the one hand, that circumcision that is obviously medically indicated is justifi ed. On the other hand, clear long-lasting or irreversible serious health issues undermining interventions and the ways in which they are carried out are not justifi ed. Arguably, this implies that the most invasive form of female circumcision -infi bulation -is unacceptable just as the most extreme forms of male circumcision, as practiced by Aboriginals and by traditional circumcisers in South-Africa, are equally unacceptable.
As most circumcisions should be positioned somewhere in between these extremes, the fi rst consideration should be the level of harm infl icted by the interventions. Th is consideration should include the immediate pain infl icted by the intervention itself, health consequences, including eff ects on sexuality, in the short and long term, the (ir)reversibility of the bodily alterations and whether and to what extent health risks or harm can be reduced by the way it is carried out. It may be clear that circumcisions with minor health risks, carried out in a hygienic and professional way, possibly using anaesthesia to prevent pain, are quite unproblematic. Th e symbolic pricking could be an example of this. However, these aspects of seriousness of the intervention only off er a fi rst indication as to whether and which additional considerations may play a role in deciding whether the circumcision is or is not a justifi ed violation of bodily integrity.
A second aspect is the consent of the person to be circumcised. As self-determination is an important aspect of bodily integrity, the starting point would be to take requests of adults seriously and to normally honour them. Circumcision of children should be postponed until they are capable of choice and have a real context of choice. Th is latter issue is especially relevant when the bodily intervention is irreversible.
Th is second aspect will make irreversible and painful circumcisions more acceptable. Th is approach could render several types of circumcision in Africa less problematic, as long as they concern less extreme forms, carried out in a relatively safe way on girls and boys, or young men and women, who are capable of making informed choices and are in a position to refuse. Professionally carried out male circumcision on Muslim boys of an older age might fall within this scope. However, according to Intersentia this second consideration, circumcision on newborn Jewish babies is problematic, as are the routinely carried out circumcisions of the American type. Parents should not be allowed to decide for their young child, and thus forego their consent, unless there are very weighty reasons.
Th is brings us to the third consideration: the weight of the rationale of the bodily intervention and whether there are other less intrusive ways to serve that rationale. For example, the rationale of health because of hygiene, or for the prevention of HIV/ AIDS might not be suffi cient to justify circumcision as there are other, less invasive ways to achieve this purpose. Th e notions of beauty and normality as rationales of the American type of routinely carried out circumcision on just born boys do not seem very weighty. In contrast, the obligation for Jews to circumcise new born boys seems to be a rather strong obligation that cannot easily be replaced by something else. Compared to the Jewish religious obligation, the Islamic obligation seems weaker, and at least off ers the possibility to postpone the decision to circumcise until the child is able to make an informed decision. Th e cultural rationale in the African type of male and female circumcision, on the other hand, can be quite strong as regards the aim to be achieved (becoming a fully-fl edged member of the group), but might prove to be less strict regarding the form of the initiation rite. Th is could render some more health endangering types of circumcision (like clitoredectomy and excision) problematic.
A fourth aspect is the legitimacy of the rationale. Th e most legitimate rationale as regards circumcision is of course health benefi ts, leaving aside the discussion whether they are as clear as oft en presented. Furthermore, cultural and religious rationales are not per se legitimate. Th is leaves us with the question whether circumcision lacks legitimacy as far as the rationale aims at or perpetuates gender inequality. It seems to us that all circumcision practices, except maybe the American type, confi rm more or less to stereotyped roles of men and women. Th is seems to be more on the forefront in the African type, but is also discernable in the Abrahamic type, more specifi cally the Jewish circumcision, that serves (among others) the patriarchic confi rmation of the membership of the boy in a dominant male community.
Th erefore, we propose to consider the legitimacy of the rationale increasingly problematic when the circumcision is more directly aimed at the confi rmation of the inferiority or superiority of one of the sexes, thereby taking into account the perceptions of those who request circumcision for themselves and the social eff ects of (not) being circumcised in social reality. Th is could imply that in some contexts some forms of female circumcision are not at all legitimate, like infi bulations that are meant to confi rm the property status of a married woman. Other forms could be more legitimate in other contexts, for example in case circumcision has primarily a symbolic meaning of a rite of passage from childhood to adulthood with less gendered impact on social opportunities. Furthermore, occasionally male circumcision could be less legitimate than generally conceived.
Th ese four aspects could be considered as a fi rst attempt to develop a list of relevant criteria that may serve as standards to judge forms and types of circumcision, irrespective of where and to whom it is done. Th e health and harm risks, consent and motives for the violation of bodily integrity can and should play a role in balancing the interests involved. Arguably, such an approach makes the outcome of a global policy less straightforward, but it contributes to the use of the human rights frame in a more universalist and less gender and culture biased way. In the end, it is not about comparing male and female circumcision, but about comparing which practices can be justifi ed by standards of human rights.
